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On January 18, 2007, President Bush signed amendments to clarify and
strengthen Executive Order (E.O.) 12,866, which President Clinton had issued
to update principles for inter-agency planning and review of regulations. The
most important provisions of President Bush's E.O. 13,422 clearly extend inter-
agency review to guidance documents. E.O. 13,422 was reinforced by a Bulle-
tin for Agency Good Guidance Practices issued by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). 1 Together, E.O. 13,422 and the OMB Bulletin establish
the first government-wide "rules of the road" to manage the development and
use of guidance documents.
OMB now has clear authority to review significant agency guidance doc-
uments, just as OMB reviews significant agency regulations. The agencies, in
turn, are required to give OMB advance notice of their upcoming significant
guidance documents. OMB will be responsible for ensuring that other inter-
ested agencies occasionally have notice and an opportunity to provide input
into the most important guidance documents.
In the view of the authors, the outcry that followed the issuance of the Or-
der and Bulletin was remarkable and unwarranted. 2 On one hand, the two most
controversial provisions in E.O. 13,422 (which are irrelevant to guidance doc-
uments) were edits to authorities already provided by the Clinton Order--edits
that were unnecessary and unlikely to practically affect regulatory policy de-
t Paul R. Noe, J.D., is the Vice President of Regulatory Affairs for the Grocery Manufacturers Associa-
tion. From 2001-2006, he served as Counselor to Administrator John Graham in the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Office of Management and Budget. During that time, he drafted the
OMB Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices and the good guidance provisions in E.O. 13,422.
John D. Graham, Ph.D, is the Dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School. From 2001-2006, he served
as the Administrator of OIRA.
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in guidance documents. Finally, the Bulletin establishes public access and feedback procedures. See
Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007). For the Order,
see Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2765 (Jan. 23, 2007).
2 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Green-Zoning of America, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, at A21;
Robert Pear, Bush Directive Increases Sway on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at Al; Cindy
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velopment. 3 On the other hand, extending the existing regulatory review proc-
ess to significant guidance documents is a beneficial and essential change-the
most important change to the regulatory review process since President Reagan
formalized it in 1981. This Essay briefly reviews the evolution of E.O. 13,422
and the OMB Bulletin and argues that their good guidance provisions were
firmly supported by precedent and long overdue.
I. Background
President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291, which firmly established
OMB regulatory review, covered virtually all rules. 4 E.O. 12,291 defined its
scope by incorporating most of the definition of "rule" from the Administrative
Procedure Act, which includes not only legally binding legislative rules ("regu-
lations"), but also interpretive rules and policy statements ("guidance docu-
ments"). 5 In theory, OMB's authority under the Reagan Order was strikingly
broad on two levels: First, it did not establish a "significance" threshold for
OMB review. Second, the Order did not limit OMB review of guidance docu-
ments.
In practice, too, the breadth of OMB's authority was unwieldy. Each year,
agencies issue on the order of 4000 regulations, 6 and the number of guidance
documents is orders of magnitude larger.7 With several dozen staff, OMB's Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) cannot hope to review more
3 The most-criticized features of E.O. 13,422, a provision on Regulatory Policy Officers and a
provision on market failure analysis, were actually established by President Clinton's E.O. 12,866. E.O.
13,422 only made minor modifications to those provisions, and those modifications have little practical
significance. See Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part
I Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Admin. Law, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of Paul R. Noe, Partner, C&M Capitolink LLC), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Noe07O213.pdf. Others have staunchly disagreed, and some have
gone so far as to claim that the provision on Regulatory Policy Officers is unconstitutional. Amending
Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part I.- Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement
of Peter L. Strauss, Professor, Columbia University School of Law), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Strauss0702I3.pdf.
4 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).
5 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1981) ("'Regulation' or 'rule' means an
agency statement of general applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy or describing the procedure or practice requirements of an agency .... ).
6 See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Report to Con-
gress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (1997), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
rcongress.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
7 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1469 (1992)
(noting that the formally adopted rules of the Federal Aviation Administration are two inches thick, but
the corresponding guidance materials, over forty feet; Part 50 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
regulations on nuclear plant safety, in loose-leaf edition, is 3/16 of an inch, but the supplemental techni-
cal guidance is 9 3/4 inches; and the formally adopted regulations of the IRS occupy one foot of shelf
space, but Revenue rulings and similar publications, about twenty feet); see also H. COMM. ON GOv'T.
REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF AGENCY GUIDANCE DoCUMENTs, H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009
(2000) (noting that between March 1996 through 1999, NHTSA had issued 1225 guidance documents,
EPA 2653, and OSHA 1641).
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than a small fraction of these rules. Our understanding is that during the Reagan
and G.H.W. Bush years, OMB rarely called in guidance documents for review
and did not have an established practice for doing so. However, OIRA did rou-
tinely review large numbers of legislative rules in its early years.
8
In 1993, President Clinton replaced the Reagan Order with E.O. 12,866,
which limited OIRA review to "regulatory actions" that were "significant."
This was both wise and unwise. Given the vastness of federal regulatory activ-
ity and the limited resources of OIRA, it was eminently sensible to try to sort
the significant agency activity from the insignificant. The problem is that while
the Clinton Order applied to significant legally binding regulations, it neglected
guidance documents. Indeed, while the Clinton Order is less than pellucid, it
evidently curtailed the previous OMB authority over guidance documents.
9
Former OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen has stated that "Executive Order
12,866 was written to apply only where agencies undertook regulatory actions
that had the force and effect of law"' 0 and that she never reviewed a guidance
document during her tenure in the Clinton administration. If that is the case, we
believe that the Clinton Order was not only unclear but also fundamentally
flawed. 11
II. The Foundation for Good Guidance Practices
There is a strong foundation for the good guidance practices reflected in
the OMB Bulletin and E.O. 13,422. First and foremost, the Administrative
8 A cursory review of the record shows that OIRA reviewed a much greater number of rules
under E.O. 12,291 during the Reagan and Bush-41 years than under E.O. 12,866 during the Clinton and
Bush-43 years. For example, under E.O. 12,291, OIRA reviewed 2637 rules in 1982 (79 were economi-
cally significant) and in 1990 reviewed 2137 (82 were economically significant). By contrast, under
E.O. 12,866, OIRA reviewed 831 rules in 1994 (134 were economically significant) and in 2002 re-
viewed 669 rules (100 were economically significant). See Office of Mgmt & Budget, Review Counts,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchlnit?action=init (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
9 E.O. 12,866 applied to an "agency statement of general applicability and future effect, which
the agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that is designed to implement, interpret or pre-
scribe law or policy or to describe the procedure or practice requirements of an agency." See Exec. Or-
der No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R 638, 641 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (emphasis added).
10 Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part L
Hearing Before the Subcomm on Investigation & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 110th
Cong. 9 (2007) (statement of Sally Katzen, Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law School),
available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media//File/Commdocs/hearings/2007/oversight/13feb/
katzentestimony pdf.
11 The growth in so-called "spurious rule" court cases in the 1990s may not be a coincidence.
See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (striking down PCB risk assessment
guidance as a spurious rule requiring notice and comment); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d
1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (striking down emissions monitoring guidance as spurious rule requiring notice
and comment); U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (striking
down OSHA Directive as a spurious rule requiring notice and comment). An interesting research project
would be to compare the growth in "spurious rule" court cases with the abstention of OMB review of
guidance documents. See also Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432,
3435 (Jan. 25, 2007); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Key to Public Comments,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/keycomments.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
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Conference of the United States (ACUS) 12 issued recommendations for the de-
velopment and use of agency guidance documents.1 3 As far back as the mid-
1970s, for example, ACUS recognized the importance of ensuring a notice and
comment process for the most significant guidance documents.
ACUS Recommendation 76-5 states:
Before an agency issues, amends or repeals an interpretive rule of general appli-
cability or statement of general policy which is likely to have a substantial im-
pact on the public, the agency normally should utilize the procedures set forth in
the Administrative Procedure Act subsections 553(b) and (c) .... Where there
has been no prepromulgation notice and opportunity for comment, the publica-
tion of an interpretive rule of general applicability or a statement of general pol-
icy... should include ... an invitation to interested persons to submit written
comments.'
4
ACUS Recommendation 92-2 later added:
Agencies should not issue statements of general applicability that are intended to
impose binding substantive standards or obligations upon affected persons with-
out using legislative rulemaking procedures .... Policy statements of general
applicability should make clear that they are not binding .... Agencies that issue
policy statements should examine, and where necessary, change their ... proce-
dures... to allow as an additional subject requests for modification or reconsid-
eration of such statements. 
15
In 1993, the American Bar Association (ABA) reaffirmed the ACUS rec-
ommendations on the use of informal notice and comment procedure for sig-
nificant guidance documents.' 6 In 2001, the ABA further recommended that
agencies "explore means to maximize the availability and searchability of exist-
ing law and policy on their websites" and include "their governing statutes, all
12 ACUS was a federal advisory agency charged with providing recommendations on admin-
istrative procedure issues. During its existence from 1986 to 1995, ACUS made over 300 recommenda-
tions on administrative procedure issues, and over 200 were adopted by agencies or by Congress. See
Florida State University College of Law, ABA Administrative Procedure Database,
www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
13 See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Agency Pol-
icy Statements, Rec. 92-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (1992), available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305922.html; AM. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT INCLUDING
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 57 (1993) ("[T]he American Bar Association
recommends that: Before an agency adopts a nonlegislative rule that is likely to have a significant im-
pact on the public, the agency provide an opportunity for members of the public to comment on the pro-
posed rule and to recommend alternative policies or interpretations, provided that it is practical to do so;
when nonlegislative rules are adopted without pnor public participation, immediately following adop-
tion, the agency afford the public an opportunity for post-adoption comment and give notice of this op-
portunity.").
14 Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Interpretive
Rules of General Applicability and Statements of General Policy, Rec. 76-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992),
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305765.html.
15 Agency Policy Statements, Rec. 92-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2.
16 AM. BA Ass'N, supra note 13.
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agency rules and regulations, and all important policies, interpretations, and
other like matters which members of the public are likely to request."17
In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) created a guidance
document distilling its good guidance practices (GGP). 18 Following the FDA's
publication of its original GGP, Congress then mandated by law certain aspects
of the 1997 GGP document in the Food and Drug Administration Moderniza-
tion Act of 1997 (FDAMA). 1 9 In FDAMA, Congress detailed basic elements of
good guidance practices and required the FDA to issue new GGP as regula-
tions.2 °
In the legislative history of FDAMA, Congress expressed particular con-
cern about public knowledge of, and access to, FDA guidance documents; the
lack of a systematic process for adopting guidance documents and for allowing
public input; and inconsistency in the use of guidance documents. Recogniz-
ing that those same concerns apply to other agencies as well, OMB used the
FDA regulations mandated by Congress as a model for its government-wide
Good Guidance Practices.
22
Finally, though ACUS and the ABA do not have formal positions specifi-
cally addressing OMB review of guidance documents, they produced long-
standing recommendations supporting presidential oversight of rulemaking as
an essential element of good government.
23
In sum, the good guidance provisions of E.O. 13,422 and the OMB Bulle-
tin are firmly rooted in the recommendations of leading authorities that have
stood for decades. If anything, the Order and Bulletin modestly implement
17 AM. BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION ON FEDERAL AGENCY WEB PAGES 1 (2001),
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/federa02.pdf.
18 The Food and Drug Administration's Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Docu-
ments, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (Feb. 27, 1997).
19 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2000).
20 Id (establishing FDA good guidance practices as law). The FDAMA also directed the FDA
to evaluate the effectiveness of the 1997 GGP document and then to develop and issue the regulations
specifying the FDA's policies and procedures for the development, issuance and use of guidance docu-
ments. The FDA conducted an internal evaluation soliciting FDA employees' views on the effectiveness
of GGP and asking whether FDA employees had received complaints regarding the agency's develop-
ment, issuance and use of guidance documents since the development of GGP. FDA found that its GGP
had been beneficial and effective in standardizing the agency's procedures for development, issuance
and use of guidance documents, and that FDA employees had generally been following GGP The FDA
then made some changes to its existing procedures to clarify its GGP. See Administrative Practices and
Procedures: Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2007).
21 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1997,
S. REP. NO. 105-43, at 26 (1997).
22 See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 (Jan. 25,
2007).
23 See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Presidential
Review of Agency Rulemaking, Rec. 88-9, 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-9 (1992), available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305889.html ("Presidential review should apply generally to
federal rulemaking."); AM. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REGULATORY PRACTICE, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION ON PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW OF RULEMAKING 1
(1990) (same); AM. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT 1 (1986) (same).
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those recommendations. For example, E.O. 13,422 established a more stream-
lined review process for guidance documents than used for regulations. Like-
wise, the OMB Bulletin requires pre-adoption notice and comment only for po-
tentially "economically significant" guidance, whereas the FDA, as well as
ACUS and the ABA, would do so for all significant guidance.
24
III. The Need for Good Guidance Practices
We support prioritizing regulatory review based on significance as Presi-
dent Clinton's E.O. 12,866 did, but we have no doubt that guidance documents
can be quite significant and have been neglected.
Although guidance documents may not properly carry the force of law,
they are a key component of regulatory programs. As the breadth and complex-
ity of regulatory programs has grown, agencies increasingly have relied on
guidance documents to provide direction to their staff and to the public. That
direction is essential to operating regulatory programs.
Nonetheless, concerns have persisted over the years about agency guid-
ance practices. On one level, there are basic concerns about due process and
fairness-the need for greater transparency, opportunity for comment, and ac-
countability in issuing guidance. There also have been concerns about the need
for coordination and management of guidance documents so they are coherent
within and across agency programs and do not conflict with the priorities of the
President. Finally, there is growing concern that guidance documents often are
being used in lieu of regulations-without observing the procedural safeguards
for regulations. As the D.C. Circuit observed:
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly
worded statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language,
open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the
agency issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting, de-
fining and often expanding the commands in regulations. One guidance docu-
ment may yield another and then another and so on.... Law is made, without
24 See FDA Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F R § 10.115(g) (2007) (pre-adoption notice and
comment for "Level I" guidance documents); Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, Interpretive Rules of General Applicability and Statements of General Policy, Rec.
76-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76 (1992), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305765.htm
(pre-adoption notice and comment for nonlegislative rules "likely to have a substantial impact"); AM.
BAR Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT INCLUDING PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 57
(1993) (same). While the OMB did not go so far as to mandate pre-adoption notice and comment for all
significant guidance, the OMB encouraged it. As it stated in the preamble to its Bulletin:
Although this Bulletin does not require agencies to provide notice and an opportunity for pub-
lic comment on all significant guidance documents before they are adopted, it is often benefi-
cial for an agency to do so when they determine that it is practical. Pre-adoption notice-and-
comment can be most helpful for significant guidance documents that are particularly com-
plex, novel, consequential, or controversial.
72 Fed. Reg. at 3438. Perhaps in the future after the Bulletin has been successfully implemented, its
scope could be expanded consistent with this precedent.
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notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the25
Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations.
It should be noted that whether or not guidance documents are "spurious
rules" 26 subject to legal challenge, as a practical matter guidance can have co-
ercive effects or lead parties to alter their conduct. As OMB explained in the
preamble to the Bulletin:
For example, under a statute or regulation that would allow a range of actions to
be eligible for a permit or other desired agency action, a guidance document
might specify fast track treatment for a particular narrow form of behavior but
subject other behavior to a burdensome application process with an uncertain li-
kelihood of success. Even if not legally binding, such guidance could affect be-
havior in a way that might lead to an economically significant impact. Similarly,
an agency might make a pronouncement about the conditions under which it be-
lieves a particular substance or product is unsafe. While not legally binding,
such a statement could be reasonably anticipated to lead to changes in behavior
by the private sector or governmental authorities such that it would lead to a sig-
nificant economic effect. 27
Because such impacts-while perhaps more remote and attenuated-can be as
significant as the impacts of regulations, it is reasonable that the Bulletin estab-
lishes a presumption of pre-adoption notice and comment for "economically
significant" guidance and that E.O. 13,422 facilitates interagency review of
significant guidance.
Prior to the issuance of E.O. 13,422 and the Bulletin on Good Guidance
Practices, OMB had received scores of examples of problematic guidance and
agency practices in response to its 2002 request for comments on problematic
28 . 29guidance, other requests for regulatory reform nominations, and the public
comments on the proposed Bulletin. 30 The supporters of good guidance prac-
tices were as diverse as the Ornithological Council, homebuilders, funeral di-
rectors, the farming community, large and small business, educational organi-
zations, and state and local government.
25 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (striking down
emissions monitoring guidance as requiring notice and comment through legislative rulemaking proce-
dures).
26 See supra note 11.
27 See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. at 3435.
28 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Key to Public Comments, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/keyscomments.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
29 Office of Mgmt & Budget, Peer Review and Public Comments on the 2005 Draft Report to
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and
Tribal Entities, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/toc.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2007);
Office of Mgmt & Budget, Public Comments on 2004 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Bene-
fits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2004cb/list_2004cb.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
30 Office of Mgmt & Budget, Comments on Proposed Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/good-guid/c-index.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2007).
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As OMB detailed in the preamble to the Bulletin, such concerns have
been raised for years by many authorities, including Congress,
3 1 the courts, 32
the Executive Branch,33 the ABA,34 scholars,35 and the regulated community.36
In July 2007, after a rider to block funding for implementation of E.O.
13,422 was attached to a House appropriations bill, the regulated community
swiftly reacted to oppose a similar Senate provision. Sixty-four trade associa-
tions representing most of the American economy opposed the rider, including
big and small business, agriculture, education and other interests. 37 The pri-
mary motivation evidently was to preserve the good guidance practices re-
flected in the Order and Bulletin. 38 In addition, the Director of OMB sent a let-
31 See, e.g., Congressional Review Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000) (providing fast-
track procedures for Congressional resolutions of disapproval of rules and incorporating the APA defini-
tion of "rule"); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 37 1(h) (2000)
(establishing FDA good guidance practices as law); Congressional Accountability for Regulatory Infor-
mation Act, H.R. 3521, 106th Cong. § 4 (2000) (proposing to require agencies to notify the public of the
non-binding effect of guidance documents), H. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, NON-BINDING
LEGAL EFFECT OF AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009 (2000) (criticizing "back-
door" regulation); FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF
1997, S. REP. NO. 105-43, at 26 (1997) (raising concerns about the lack of transparency and consistency
in the use of guidance documents).
32 See supra note 11.
33 Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Agency Policy
Statements, Rec. 92-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (1992), available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305922.html (stating that agencies should afford the public a
fair opportunity to challenge the legality or wisdom of policy statements and to suggest alternative
choices); Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Interpretive Rules of
General Applicability and Statements of General Policy, Rec. 76-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76 (1992), available
at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305765.html (stating that agencies should utilize APA
notice and comment procedures for interpretive rules of general applicability or statements of general
policy likely to have a substantial impact on the public ); The Food and Drug Administration's Devel-
opment, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (Feb 27, 1997) (notice) (estab-
lishing FDA's original good guidance practices); Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of
Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,034-35 (Office of Mgmt. & Budget Mar. 28, 2002) (detail-
ing concerns over soliciting public comments on problematic agency guidance practices and specific
examples of guidance documents in need of reform).
34 AM. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT INCLUDING PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH
ANNUAL MEETING 57 (1993) (recommending notice and comment for guidance documents likely to
have a significant impact on the public); AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 17 (recommending that agencies
post on their Websites, inter alia, all important policies and interpretations).
35 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious"
Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. I (1994); Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy State-
ments, Guidances, Manuals and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public? 41
DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992).
36 One of the more notorious examples of problematic agency guidance dunng the Clinton
administration was an OSHA advisory letter instructing a company stating that employers were liable
for ensuring that the home offices of their employees were in compliance with OSHA workplace regula-
tions. See OSHA Policy Concerning Employees Working at Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 106th Cong. (2000), available
at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/edu/hedo&i6-8 1.000/hedo&i6-8 I.htm.
37 Letter from sixty-four trade associations to The Honorable Robert C. Byrd, Chairman,
Comm. on Appropriations, and The Honorable Thad Cochran, Ranking Member, Comm. on Appropria-
tions (July 12, 2007) (on file with the author).
38 See Cindy Skryzcki, Congress Balks at White House Rulemaking Order, WASH. POST, July
17, 2007, at D2.
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ter to the appropriators threatening a veto recommendation for any provision
that would prohibit funding or restrict implementation of E.O. 13,422. 39
The rider was dropped before the Senate appropriations committee mar-
kup, but the rider still had strong support. 40 Following a debate on the Order
and Bulletin at the annual meeting of the ABA Section of Administrative Law
and Regulatory Practice, the Section sent letters to Congress opposing defund-
ing of the Bulletin and the good guidance provisions of the Order. Ultimately,
the House rider was chopped from the final consolidated appropriations act.
42
In the day-to-day operations of the Executive Branch, there is a need for
ground rules to address ignorance and confusion about what agencies are doing
on important guidance documents. Likewise, there is a need to demarcate the
authority and responsibilities of OMB and the agencies. E.O. 13,422 clarifies
while streamlining the traditional review process. For guidance documents, the
agencies need only provide OMB with an advance list of upcoming significant
guidance (not the guidance itself, nor an economic analysis). OMB can call in
for review only the small share of guidance documents that merit consideration
by its limited staff and the other interested agencies. This avoids needless bur-
dens on the agencies and OMB.
Finally, clear OMB authority over guidance documents is necessary to
preserve OMB's authority over regulations. Otherwise, the dysfunction diag-
nosed by the D.C. Circuit in Appalachian Power could occur in the regulatory
review process. An agency could issue "regulations containing broad language,
open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like."4 3 Such skeletal regula-
tion might pass through interagency review without raising concerns. However,
the agency could then follow with guidance "expanding the commands in the
regulations" 44 and so forth to a degree that would have raised concerns in the
interagency review process-or in Congress-had the details appeared in the
regulations from the start. Indeed, the dearth of clear OMB authority could ex-
plain how Appalachian Power occurred.
From that perspective, E.O. 13,422 can be viewed as part of a larger
movement by the three constitutional branches of government-the Legisla-
39 Letter from Rob Portman, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Honorable Robert C.
Byrd, Chairman, Comm. on Appropriations (July 12, 2007) (on file with the author).
40 See Durbin Vows to Block Funds for White House Regulatory Review Order, INSIDE EPA,
Aug. 22, 2007 (on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
41 See Letter from Michael Asimow, Chair of the ABA Section of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice, to Senators Richard Durbin and Sam Brownback (Nov. 8, 2007) (on file with the
author). The letter does not take a position with respect to the controversial provisions of E.O. 13,422.
See also supra note 3.
42 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS
AMENDMENT, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2008, at 78,
available at http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/omni/jes/esdvd.pdf.
43 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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Yale Journal on Regulation
tive, 45 the Judicial, 46 and the Executive-to assert authority over the so-called
"Fourth Branch of Government."
IV. Conclusion
Controversy has been with us since the inception of centralized review of
rules, and doubtless it will continue. Nonetheless, it is our hope that a close
consideration of the relevant language and practical significance of E.O. 13,422
and the OMB Bulletin will mitigate those concerns. Formally extending the
regulatory review process to guidance documents was much needed and long
overdue.
45 Congress asserted direct supervisory power and "veto" authority over agency rules-both
regulations and guidance documents-in the Congressional Review Act of 1996. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)
(2000) (incorporating the APA's definition of "rule"). As discussed above, in FDAMA Congress legis-
latively mandated FDA's pre-existing good guidance practices. See supra notes 18-21 and accompany-
ing text.
46 See supra notes I 1 & 25 and accompanying text.
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